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Industrial Incentives
Competition among American 
States and Cities
An recent years, there has been much 
"revisionist" research on the effects of 
economic development programs at the 
state and local level. There is now 
substantial evidence that economic 
development programs can help local 
economies by reducing unemployment 
and increasing earnings. Some, such as 
Bartik (in his book Who Benefits from 
State and Local Economic Development 
Policies?), have gone beyond this to argue 
that such local policies may benefit the 
nation if the incentives are concentrated 
in low-growth or high-unemployment 
regions, because the benefits of jobs 
created there will exceed the benefits lost 
by not creating jobs in low- 
unemployment areas.
Are the economic development 
incentives offered by states and cities 
significantly higher in high- 
unemployment places? This article 
summarizes the results of a study, 
sponsored by the Upjohn Institute, that 
uses new data to examine the spatial 
pattern of incentive offers.
In our research, we measured 
competition among places based on the 
dollar value of a locality's standing 
incentive offer to industrial firms 
expanding or locating in that locality. The 
standing offer included the whole range 
of competitive incentives over which state
or local governments have some direct 
control: income tax investment and jobs 
credits, property tax abatements, sales tax 
exemptions, grants, loans, loan 
guarantees, and firm-specific job-training 
and infrastructure subsidies. Because 
incentives may be embedded in tax codes, 
and because the value of incentives to a 
firm must be measured net of income tax 
effects, we also modeled the federal 
corporate income tax, each state's and 
city's corporate income and net worth 
taxes, the major state and local sales taxes 
paid by business, and local property taxes. 
We used the hypothetical firm method 
to measure the value of competitive 
incentives. We constructed financial 
statements for 16 hypothetical firms, 
representing the characteristics of a 
typical large and small firm in each of 
eight fast-growing manufacturing 
industries. The model then measured the 
net returns on a new plant investment, 
after all taxes and incentives. The new 
plant is located in one of 24 states, the 24 
that account for the most manufacturing 
employment in the United States 
(combined, they represent 86% of the 
total), and in one of 112 cities, randomly 
selected from within these 24 states.
(continued on p. 3)
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From the Executive Director
he Institute over the years has 
forged lasting and productive associations 
with scholars and practitioners from many 
organizations and in many parts of the 
country. For 15 years starting in 1962, the 
Institute maintained an office in 
Washington, D.C., from which prominent 
policy experts such as Sar Levitan, Saul 
Blaustein, Herbert Striner, and Irving 
Siegel led the Institute staff on important 
projects related to federal employment 
policy.
Times have changed. We have seen a 
major shift in the locus of policy making, 
with state and local governments 
assuming much more responsibility for 
social programs and with private 
foundations promoting social initiatives. 
We have also witnessed a revolution in 
information technology, particularly 
e-mail and Internet access to information. 
Both changes have drastically reduced the 
necessity of locating in the Washington 
area in order to be a prominent player in 
analyzing and evaluating policy and in 
informing the policy debate.
Currently, our research affiliations 
extend from Japan to Hungary and from 
Canada to Australia. For instance, we 
recently co-sponsored a conference with 
the Canadian International Labor 
Network (CILN), which brought together 
20 prominent economists from six 
European countries, Japan, Australia, 
Canada, and the United States and was 
organized by Peter Kuhn of McMaster 
University. These scholars provided in- 
depth country comparisons of worker 
displacement and the extent of their 
unemployment spells and earnings losses, 
marking the first time that researchers 
have been able to use micro-level data 
across this many countries to address job 
displacement, which is currently a major 
concern to many European and Asian 
countries. This research will appear as an 
Institute publication.
Allan Hunt, Assistant Director of the 
Institute, has finished a project in 
Australia with the Victorian Workcover 
Authority. Dr. Hunt led a team of 
researchers to evaluate the performance 
and structure of Victoria's workers' 
compensation system and to provide 
recommendations for improving the 
system. This work is mentioned in his 
article in this issue of the newsletter.
Closer to home, we have had the 
privilege over the last six months of 
working with one of the nation's leading 
urbanologists, David Rusk. Author of the 
widely acclaimed book Cities without 
Suburbs, Mr. Rusk has worked with many 
communities to address issues of housing, 
neighborhoods, schools, urban 
redevelopment and revitalization, and 
urban sprawl. He is currently working in 
the Kalamazoo area and has been based at 
the Institute while conducting his 
research. Institute staff have worked 
closely with Mr. Rusk, collecting data and 
analyzing local trends and conducting in- 
depth studies of the performance of 
Michigan school districts and the 
feasibility of tax-base sharing arrange 
ments among local cities and townships.
The Institute also keeps abreast of 
recent research through our annual 
Dissertation Award. Each year we receive 
many excellent dissertations, and the 
selection committee is always challenged 
to choose the top three. As described in 
the column to the right, this year's award 
went to Steven Haider of the University of 
Michigan for his work on income 
inequality. Our congratulations to him 
and to the two runners-up.
Given the extensive involvement of 
the Institute with various agencies and 
organizations, it is safe to say that our 
location in the country's heartland has not 
impeded our ability to carry out our 
mission.
Randall W. Eberts
1998 Dissertation 
Award Winners
The W.E. Upjohn Institute is pleased to 
announce the winner of its fourth annual 
Dissertation Award: Steven J. Haider, of 
the University of Michigan, for 
"Econometric Studies of Long-Run 
Earnings Inequality." Haider's 
dissertation advisor was Gary Solon.
Two honorable mentions were also 
chosen: Kanika Kapur of Northwestern 
University for "Labor Market 
Implications of Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance," and Paul A. Smith of 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison for 
"The Impact of the 1981 Welfare Reforms 
on Female-Headed Households." Kapur's 
advisor was Bruce D. Meyer, and Smith's 
was Robert Haveman.
Haider's dissertation comprises three 
studies. First he examines the relationship 
among annual earnings inequality, 
lifetime earnings inequality, and earnings 
stability. Then he examines the long-run 
earnings inequality at the family level, 
where he finds that the increasing 
earnings inequality for husbands was 
responsible for 75 percent of the gross 
increase in family earnings inequality. 
Haider also develops an estimation 
technique, used in other portions of his 
work, that is applicable to a broad class of 
incomplete data problems.
Kapur addresses the gap between 
policy and research in the areas of 
medical insurance portability and job 
mobility, small firms and the small-group 
health insurance market, and the impact 
of recent state-level health insurance 
legislation. Smith uses two approaches to 
analyze the effects of changes in welfare- 
program benefit formulas and eligibility 
rules on the economic well-being of, and 
the choices made by, low-income 
individuals.
Winners of the Dissertation Award 
receive a cash prize of $2,000. Each 
honorable mention receives a $500 prize.
The deadline for submission for the 
1999 award is July 7, 1999. Any 
individual whose dissertation has been 
accepted during the 12-month period of 
July 1, 1998, to June 30, 1999, is eligible 
for the 1999 prize.
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(Continued from p. 1)
Is There Significant Variation 
in Returns across Locations?
Is there sufficient variation in returns 
on investment across states and cities that 
tax and incentive differences could affect 
location decisions? If incentives have 
little effect on profitability at different 
sites, there is little reason to worry about 
their effects on redistributing 
employment.
We found large differences between 
the returns available at the "best" 
locations and returns available at the 
"worst" locations, considering state and 
local tax systems and tax incentives (but 
not other incentives). Even when we 
ignored variation within states by 
focusing on a representative city in each 
state, we found effective state/local tax 
rates on new investment that ranged, for
example, from 1.7% to 10.2% for a small 
but profitable manufacturer of soaps and 
toiletries, and from 4.1% to 23.8% for a 
large but low-profit automobile 
manufacturer. These are the extreme 
cases; for the typical sector, the highest- 
tax state placed a tax burden on 
manufacturers that was about three times 
as large as that in the lowest-tax state.
Another way of examining the 
magnitude of incentives is to measure the 
difference between the best and the worst 
standing offers among our sample of cities 
and then to convert this difference to an 
hourly wage equivalent. For some firms, 
the results were startling. For the large 
drug firm, the difference between the best 
and worst sites translated into an average 
hourly wage difference of $1.82. For 
most firms modeled, the equivalent hourly 
wage difference between the best and 
worst sites was between $0.65 and $0.95 
per hour. Moreover, the spreads between
cities at, for example, the 80th and 20th 
percentiles or the 75th and 25th 
percentiles remained large. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that, at least at the 
extremes, taxes and incentives are 
potentially large enough to influence 
location decisions.
The inclusion of non-tax incentives 
very often did little to change the majority 
of cities in the top 20 or bottom 20. In 
most cases, cities that were highly 
competitive after taxes and tax incentives 
were also highly competitive after the 
inclusion of non-tax incentives. Overall, 
non-tax incentives did not ameliorate, but 
actually accentuated, the tax differentials 
between the best and worst cities.
Three tentative conclusions emerge: 
1) the differences in investment returns 
across states and cities due to tax and 
incentive differences are quite substantial, 
and it is certainly plausible that these 
differences are large enough to influence
Figure 1 Rate of Return on New Plant Investment in the 25 Cities with Highest Return after Incentives: 
Multi-state Instruments Manufacturer, $180 Million Plant
25.0%
22.0%
19.0%
16.0%
City Unemployment Rate (%)
03EZ Incentives
D Other Incentives
  IRR after Basic Taxes
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location choices; 2) the magnitude of 
incentives, relative to returns after taxes 
but without incentives, is substantial; and 
3) incentive competition per se is not 
producing convergence across sites; if 
anything, it is increasing inter-site 
differences.
Are Returns Higher in 
High-Unemployment Cities?
We focus here on the results for the 
sample of 112 cities, using actual local 
tax rates and incentive programs as well 
as state taxes and incentives. Almost all 
of the correlations between 
unemployment and taxes or incentives are 
of modest size. There is a consistently 
negative relationship between unem 
ployment and returns after basic taxes 
(without any incentives); the highest- 
unemployment places have the highest tax 
burdens. There is a consistently positive 
relationship between unemployment and 
tax incentives: the highest-unemployment 
places offer the largest state and local tax 
incentives. This result is dominated by 
local property-tax abatements and by 
enterprise-zone (EZ) incentives; we 
deliberately allowed the largest incentives 
available in a city (which would be 
enterprise-zone incentives in the 40% of 
our cities with such zones) to represent 
the city as a whole. Considering non-tax 
incentives, there is no clear pattern of 
providing inducements to shift jobs either 
towards or away from high- 
unemployment places.
Figure 1 illustrates the lack of any 
consistent pattern by focusing on a firm 
that was typical in terms of the correlation 
of taxes and incentives with 
unemployment the instruments 
manufacturer building a $180 million 
plant. We show only the top 25 cities (those 
with the highest return for this plant after 
taking into account all taxes and 
incentives) ordered by unemployment rate. 
For each city, the graph shows the rate of 
return after basic taxes and how this rate of 
return is improved through the provision of 
enterprise zone incentives and other (tax 
and non-tax) incentives. Some cities that 
ranked poorly after basic taxes improved 
their position dramatically through non- 
enterprise zone incentives; others did so
through enterprise zone credits. Some 
cities, including some with relatively low 
unemployment, were very competitive 
without incentives and enhanced their 
position further through incentives. But 
incentives are not primarily compensating 
for high basic taxes.
While incentives do modestly favor 
places with higher unemployment, these 
incentives only offset the tendency of 
basic state taxes on business to be higher 
in high-unemployment states. The end 
result is a spatial pattern of returns on new 
investment that is essentially random: 
there is no discernible tendency for 
returns to be more attractive in high- 
unemployment or in low-unemployment 
places. It appears that, after at least a 
decade and a half of intense competition 
for investment and jobs and the 
widespread adoption of pro-development 
tax policies and development programs, 
states and cities have produced a system 
of taxes and incentives that provides no 
clear inducement for firms to invest in 
higher-unemployment places. It is true 
that in the absence of that competition the 
pattern of returns might well favor the 
least distressed places. However, this is 
difficult to say for certain, because some 
of the "perversity" we observed in state 
taxes may itself be the result of 
competitive pressures that produced 
changes in the underlying tax codes of 
certain states. Some incentives are 
embedded in what we modeled as the 
"basic" tax system.
Conclusions: The National 
Benefits of Competitive Economic 
Development Policy
These results are consistent with the 
following arguments (though they 
certainly cannot be taken as proof):
1) State and local tax reductions and 
development incentives are adopted for a 
variety of reasons, high unemployment 
perhaps being one, but slow growth and 
simple imitation of others being more 
important reasons.
2) Even where economic distress, as 
measured by high unemployment, may 
have provided the original political 
impetus to cut business taxes or adopt 
incentives, these measures are likely to
persist even if state economic 
performance improves.
To the extent that tax and incentive 
competition results in a redistribution of 
jobs, our research lends little support to 
the argument that this redistribution has 
beneficial effects for the nation as a whole 
(by shifting jobs from places with low 
unemployment to places with high 
unemployment). Neither can we say that it 
is clearly harmful (i.e., by providing 
inducements to redistribute jobs in the 
opposite direction). Of course, one can 
only speculate what the spatial pattern of 
returns on investment in 1992 would have 
looked like had states and cities never 
undertaken to influence their economic 
fortunes by offering inducements to 
industry in competition with one another. 
Only if this pattern would have been 
distinctly counterproductive (with higher 
returns in lower-unemployment places) 
could one conclude that competition has 
been beneficial, by nullifying such effects.
This article describes research published in 
the Upjohn Institute book of the same title. Drs. 
Fisher and Peters are professors of urban 
planning at the University of Iowa.
The Institute is interested in publishing 
books in these areas:
  Causes and consequences of unem 
ployment
  Compensation: earnings and benefits
  Economic development of local labor 
markets
  Family labor issues
  Labor-management relations
  Social insurance and income mainte 
nance programs
  Work arrangements
  Workforce quality: education and 
training
See our Web site (at www.upjohninst.org/ 
research.html) for descriptions of these 
areas.
Please submit manuscripts or proposals to
H. Allan Hunt
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
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H. Allan Hunt
introduction
Only three countries in the world 
maintain sub-national workers' 
compensation systems: Australia, Canada, 
and the United States. Three models are 
used to organize the insurance 
responsibilities for making the payments 
to injured or ill workers: private market, 
exclusive public insurer, and mixed 
(although the three models do not 
correspond exactly with the three 
countries). All 10 Canadian provinces, 
6 U.S. states, and 3 jurisdictions in 
Australia use the exclusive public insurer 
approach; the remaining 44 U.S. states 
and 4 jurisdictions in Australia use a 
predominately private market approach; 
and 3 Australian states use a mixed 
approach, in which the public fund bears 
the underwriting risk, but private firms 
collect and disburse the money.
We will look at each of the three 
models, one from each country. 1 Studying 
different jurisdictions, even though from 
different nations, follows the tradition of 
using the "laboratory of the states" to 
inform policy decisions. We will describe 
the essential features of each system and 
then review system performance.
British Columbia
British Columbia has an exclusive 
public fund (monopoly) that collects the 
insurance assessment from employers and 
pays the specified benefits to workers. 
Virtually all employers are required to 
purchase coverage from the Workers' 
Compensation Board of British Columbia 
(WCB). Premiums are determined by the 
WCB annually for some 70 classes of 
employer and are designed to ensure that, 
in the aggregate, all future benefits arising 
from injuries and illnesses in the current 
year can be paid from the funds collected 
in that year. The WCB also attempts to see
that employers are treated equitably in 
their relative cost of assessment. 
Experience-rating provides that 
assessment rates can vary by one-third 
(either up or down) from the class 
average. The British Columbia fund is 
fully forward funded (unlike many 
others), and 35-40 percent of annual 
income is currently derived from 
investment earnings on reserves held 
against future obligations.
Michigan
Michigan has a fairly pure private 
system, which is noteworthy for a large 
segment (about 50%) of self-insurance. 
This self-insured sector includes the huge 
firms of the auto industry and an extensive 
"group self-insurance" program for 
smaller employers. Michigan is also noted 
for its very early, and successful, 
deregulation of insurance rate-making in 
1983 (the second jurisdiction in the 
United States to do so). Insurance prices 
are set by individual insurers based on 
market considerations, with no 
interference from the state. With the sale 
of its state accident fund in 1994, 
Michigan demonstrated that it did not 
wish to foster the competition of public 
firms with private firms; Michigan put its 
faith completely in the market.
Victoria
Victoria has a workers' compensation 
system that is unique to Australia, 
characterized by public underwriting 
(risk-bearing) but private marketing, 
premium collection, and claims 
administration. The impetus for this 
system came from widespread 
dissatisfaction with the private system 
before 1985 and strong revulsion to the 
excesses of a monopoly public system 
from 1985 to 1992. This "third way" puts
a special burden on the administrator and 
regulator, the Victorian WorkCover 
Authority (VWA), to provide appropriate 
incentives for all participants in the 
workers' compensation system. The VWA 
bears the risk and holds the money. Some 
14 private "agents" market the insurance, 
collect the premiums, and make the 
benefit payments. Another unique 
Australian invention is the "employer 
excess." In Victoria, the employer is 
directly responsible for making the first 
10 days of income maintenance 
payments, as well as the first $317 of 
medical expenses. This is thought to 
increase employer incentives for 
prevention, to raise the likelihood of 
prompt payment of income maintenance 
benefits, and to reduce system 
administrative costs.
Benefit Differences and Similarities
So, we have three quite different 
administrative and regulatory systems 
designed to accomplish basically the 
same tasks. Before looking at overall 
system performance, we should note 
some significant differences in benefits 
among the three systems. The first 
difference is in the waiting period before 
wage replacement benefits commence. In 
British Columbia, the public fund pays 
from the first day of lost wages. In 
Michigan, the insurer begins paying after 
7 days have passed. In Victoria, the 
employer is responsible for paying the 
first 10 days of lost wages directly. These 
differences have significant implications 
for the number of claims that are 
compensable and, hence, that the 
administrative entity has to deal with. 
They also have implications for any 
attempt to compare the performance of 
these three systems.
Wage replacement levels for injured 
workers also differ and are set by statute. 
Michigan specifies that injured workers 
shall receive 80 percent of their pre-injury 
net wage (net of taxes), subject to a 
maximum at 90% of the state average 
weekly wage ($533/week in 1997). 2 
British Columbia provides 75 percent 
wage replacement against the net wage, 
again subject to a maximum ($580/week 
in 1997). Benefits are free of federal and
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state income taxes in both British 
Columbia and Michigan. Victoria replaces 
95 percent of the workers' pre-injury base 
wage (not including overtime or premium 
pay), subject to a maximum of 100% of 
average weekly earnings ($505/week in 
1997); this drops to 60 percent at 26 
weeks unless the worker is totally 
incapacitated or is found to have a 
"serious injury." Benefits are taxable in 
Victoria; it is also common practice for the 
employer to "top-up" the compensation 
benefit to 100% of the pre-injury weekly 
earnings in a collective agreement.
Finally, permanent disability award 
criteria vary. Victoria is just implementing 
(as of 30 September 1998) a new system 
of impairment rating, based on the 
American Medical Association's Guides 
to the Evaluation of Impairment, 4th 
Edition. This system will use medical 
practitioners, independent medical 
examiners, and medical review panels to 
rate the impairment of each worker, 
replacing the serious injury system, which 
proved to be too difficult to control. 
British Columbia uses a sophisticated 
system of interdisciplinary disability 
evaluation that includes medical doctors, 
vocational rehabilitation practitioners, 
and expert claims personnel. The 
disability pension awarded to a worker is 
the higher of the estimated medical 
impairment level or the estimated lifetime 
earnings losses. Michigan in theory pays 
wage-loss benefits for life. However, a 
system of compromise and release 
settlements ("redemptions") has evolved 
that serves to "cash out" the worker's 
claim in exchange for the employer's 
release from further liability. This system 
is run by the lawyers, who tend to think of 
it as a rather sophisticated disability rating 
system that responds to the many nuances 
of individual worker situations, injuries,
etc. Critics tend to think of it as a "crap 
shoot" where the financial results bear 
little correlation to the disabilities.
Workers' Compensation Performance
It is extraordinarily difficult to make 
comparisons across jurisdictions because 
of statutory differences and variations in 
local practice. Most comparisons are 
actually more misleading than 
informative. However, comparisons on the 
broadest aggregates may be meaningful.
First, the difference in the number of 
injuries (claims per 100 workers) is vast. 
British Columbia has more than twice as 
many compensable claims as Michigan or 
Victoria (Table 1), but this primarily 
reflects the differences in the waiting 
periods for wage-loss benefits. On the 
other hand, aggregate benefits paid per 
worker in 1997 are quite similar. Since 
aggregate benefits per worker reflects both 
the number of workers who receive 
payments and the average payment 
received, it is a better index of the actual 
burden of workers' compensation 
payments on the economy. 3 Basically, 
Victorian workers are receiving lump-sum 
payments for specific injuries, pain and 
suffering benefits, and common law 
settlements that bring them above the 
North American standard. Michigan 
workers receive lump-sum settlements 
that capitalize their future wage-loss, 
whereas British Columbia workers receive 
periodic income maintenance payments.
Table 1 also reports the average 
employers' cost of workers' 
compensation insurance. Michigan is the 
lowest (1.72 percent of payroll), followed 
by Victoria and then British Columbia. Of 
course, these results do not control for 
industry structure or a host of other 
differences between the three 
jurisdictions.
Table 1 Workers Compensation Comparison, 1997
Measure
Wage loss claims/100 workers 
Benefit payments/ worker 
Employer cost/$100 payroll
British 
Columbia
4.1
$284.27
$2.23
Michigan
1.5
$278.93 
$1.72
Victoria*
1.5 
$335.56 
$1.80
*Victoria data are for 1997-98 fiscal year. Note: Dollar values in U.S. $.
What this quick analysis seems to 
show is that comparisons between 
different workers' compensation systems 
are not simple. Moreover, the systems' 
differing structures are not the reason for 
the differences in performance. Rather, 
each system is an organic whole that has 
its own internal logic, which is why it is 
not possible to just lift features from one 
system that seems to work and insert them 
in another system that doesn't work. What 
is needed, rather, is good, aggressive 
management and attention to system 
indicators. This is one social policy area 
where the "continuous improvement" 
model makes more sense than "best 
practice." Through the continuous 
improvement path, we can all attain more 
efficient and equitable workers' 
compensation systems.
Notes
1. These are jurisdictions where the Institute has 
done work and with which we are quite familiar. The 
references cited below provide more detail on these 
three workers' compensation jurisdictions.
2. All monetary units are in U.S. dollars, based 
on average currency conversion rates for 1997.
3. Ignoring the privately borne costs. In Michi 
gan, injured workers bear the first 7 days of wage-loss 
costs, while in Victoria, the employer bears the first 
10 days of wage-loss costs. These costs are included 
in the British Columbia figures.
Suggestions for further reading
Duncan S. Ballantyne, and Lawrence 
Shiman, Revisiting Workers' Compensation 
in Michigan, Administrative Inventory, 
Workers Compensation Research Institute, 
Cambridge, MA, October 1997.
H. Allan Hunt, Peter S. Earth, Terrance J. 
Bogyo, Alan Clay ton, Robert W. Klein, and 
Ralph W. McGinn, Victorian Workers' 
Compensation System: Review and 
Analysis, Volume I, Victorian WorkCover 
Authority, Melbourne, Australia, August 
1997.
H. Allan Hunt, Peter S. Barth, and Michael 
J. Leahy, The Workers' Compensation 
System of British Columbia: Still in 
Transition, Workers' Compensation Board 
of British Columbia, Richmond, British 
Columbia, March 1996.
Dr. Hunt is Assistant Executive Director of 
the Upjohn Institute.
New Books from the Upjohn Institute
Industrial 
Incentives
Competition Among
American States
and Cities
Peter S. Fisher and Alan H. Peters, 
University of Iowa
This book by provides clear and 
concise information on what is often an 
emotionally charged subject  
economic 
development 
incentives. The 
authors' extensive 
research reveals 
tax and incentive 
policies across the 
24 most 
industrialized 
states in the 
U.S.A. and a 
sample of 112 cities from within those 
states.
"[Fisher and Peters'] research is the first 
rigorous study that provides us with 
significant information about the average 
magnitude of economic development 
incentives in the United States, how these 
incentives vary across different types of 
firms, and which states and cities offer the 
biggest incentives. It is painstakingly 
careful and fairminded. No serious 
discussion of federal, state, or local policy 
toward incentives should take place 
without taking account of their findings.
"Economic development researchers 
should consider this book a basic reference 
tool. Economic developers who want to 
know what the competition is doing should 
also find this book to be essential reading." 
Timothy J. Bartik, W.E. Upjohn Institute
307 pp. $29 cloth ISBN 0-88099-184-4 
$19 paper ISBN 0-88099-183-6 / 1998.
Growth in 
Disability Benefits
Explanations and Policy 
Implications
Kalman Rupp '-- 
Social Security Administration 
David C. Stapleton, The Lewin Group, 
Editors
This collection of original papers 
reveals why caseloads of the nation's 
two largest income entitlement 
programs for disability Social 
Security Disability Income (SSDI) and 
Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) have soared. Using the Social 
Security Administration's own data, 
the authors are able to point to factors 
that are contributing to the programs'
IP; : ;^r; ;    \ growth, including
program design, 
changing 
demographics, 
the labor market, 
and the
interaction with 
other programs in 
the nation's social 
safety net.
Contributors include Kalman 
Rupp, David C. Stapleton, Kevin A. 
Coleman, Kimberly A. Dietrich, 
Gina A. Livermore, Aaron Yelowitz, 
Charles G. Scott, Mary C. Daly, 
L. Scott Muller, Peter M. Wheeler, 
John Bound, Sherrie Kossoudji, 
Gema Ricart-Moes, Andrea 
Zeuschner, Gilbert Fisher, Melinda 
Upp, Larry Masanari, Celeste 
Hemingson, Charles Jones, Stanford 
G. Ross, Andrew I. Batavia, Howard 
H. Goldman, Jane L. Ross, Carolyn 
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